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Note 
 
Particulars of Particularity: Alleging Scienter 
and the Proper Application of Rule 9(b) to Duty-
Based Misrepresentations 
Morwenna Borden* 
On February 7, 2003, the lives of Thomas, Roberta, and 
their daughter Tammy Eames were irreversibly changed when 
all three were injured in a car accident.1 After their automobile 
insurance company denied the full coverage to the Eames, they 
brought a negligent misrepresentation claim in Delaware court, 
later removed to federal court.2 The Eames’s claim asserted 
that the language defining coverage limits in the insurer’s poli-
cy was misleading.3 The case was dismissed for failure to meet 
the heightened pleading standard set forth for fraud in Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b).4 On appeal, the Third Circuit af-
firmed dismissal,5
 
*  J.D. Candidate, University of Minnesota Law School. Special thanks 
to Professor Prentiss Cox for his invaluable assistance in the writing process 
and for his mentorship throughout my law school career. Many thanks are al-
so due the editors and staff of Minnesota Law Review for the many long hours 
they have spent poring over the substance and form of my written words. 
Lastly, but first and foremost among my supporters, eternal gratitude to Brian 
Younglove for continual encouragement, unwavering devotion, and the oft-
delivered hot meal to sustain me throughout the writing process. Copyright © 
2014 by Morwenna Borden. 
 so the Eames family petitioned the United 
 1. Eames v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 346 F. App'x 859, 860 (3d Cir. 
2009). 
 2. Id. 
 3. The Eames’s personal injury protection was termed “full.” The fullest 
protection available through their insurance company was $100,000 per per-
son. Eames v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., Civ. No. 04-1324-JJF-LPS, 2008 WL 
4455743, at *11–12 (D. Del. Sept. 30, 2008), aff’d, 346 F. App’x 859. The actual 
coverage their “full” personal injury protection coverage provided was $15,000 
per person, the statutory minimum in Delaware. Id.; see also DEL. CODE ANN. 
Tit. 21, § 2118(a)(2)(b) (2012).  
 4. Eames v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 04-1324-KAJ, 2006 
WL 2506640 (D. Del. Aug. 29, 2006), aff'd, 346 F. App'x 859. 
 5. Eames, 346 F. App'x at 859. 
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States Supreme Court for further review.6 In March 2010, the 
Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari, ultimately 
denying the family the possibility of full recompense for their 
injuries based on the pleading standard assumed to be required 
by their claim.7
The Eames family’s case highlights an emerging split in 
the federal circuit courts regarding the proper pleading stand-
ard for negligent misrepresentation claims.
  
8 Claims of negli-
gent misrepresentation and fraud by omission are generally 
held to be derivatives of fraud.9 Rule 9(b) clearly governs the 
appropriate pleading standard for fraud claims: they must be 
alleged with particularity.10 However, courts are divided over 
the correct pleading standard for duty-based misrepresentation 
claims, particularly negligent misrepresentation.11
 
 6. The petition for certiorari was, in part, an effort to resolve a circuit 
split as to whether the heightened pleading standard applies to claims brought 
under state consumer protection acts, which are provable on a showing of neg-
ligent misrepresentation. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 13–16, Eames v. 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. 346 F. App’x 859 (3d Cir. 2009) (No. 09-809).  
 Approxi-
 7. Eames v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 1006 (2010).  
 8. This is not an isolated case. Claims of negligent misrepresentation are 
routinely dismissed for failure to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s particularity require-
ments. During a single six-month period from October 2012 to April 2013, 
there were 126 cases throughout the United States in which the defendant 
moved to dismiss a negligent misrepresentation claim on Rule 9(b) grounds. 
See, e.g., Gardner v. RSM & A Foreclosure Servs., LLC, No. 12-CV-2666-JAM-
AC, 2013 WL 1129392 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2013) (motion granted); Chapman v. 
Abbott Labs., 930 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2013) (motion grant-
ed); Sovis v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., Civ. No. 12-2027 DWF/LIB, 2013 WL 
440215 (D. Minn. Feb. 5, 2013) (motion granted); Rankine v. Roller Bearing 
Co. of Am., Inc., No. 12-CV-2065-IEG BLM, 2013 WL 55802 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 
2013) (motion granted); Razi v. Razavi, No. 5:12-CV-80-OC-34PRL, 2012 WL 
7801361 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2012) (motion granted); Howard v. J.P. Morgan 
Chase Bank, N.A., No. CV12-0952-PHX DGC, 2012 WL 6589330 (D. Ariz. Dec. 
17, 2012) (motion granted); Montes v. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, Civ. No. 3:12-CV-1999-
M-BK, 2012 WL 6625379 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2012) (motion granted); Shapouri 
v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 3:12-CV-1133-JM JMA, 2012 WL 5285910 (S.D. Cal. 
Oct. 22, 2012) (motion granted). 
 9. See, e.g., PETER A. ALEES, LAW OF FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS § 2:15 
(2013) (stating that negligent misrepresentation is a form of fraud); 37 C.J.S. 
Fraud § 33 (2013) (“Fraud by omission is a subcategory of fraud.”). 
 10. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 11. A fraud-by-omission or fraud-by-concealment claim “can succeed with-
out the same level of [pleading] specificity” a normal fraud claim requires. In 
re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, & 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1189 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Baggett v. 
Hewlett-Packard Co., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1267 (C.D. Cal. 2007); 35A C.J.S. 
Federal Civil Procedure § 307 (2013). See infra notes 12–13 and accompanying 
text.  
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mately half the circuits hold that Rule 9(b) is applicable to neg-
ligent misrepresentation claims,12 while others hold that Rule 
8(a) governs.13 Rule 8(a) only requires the pleader to include “a 
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the plead-
er is entitled to relief.”14 In contrast, when claiming fraud, Rule 
9(b) requires that “a party must state with particularity the 
circumstances constituting fraud.”15
This Note discusses the similarities and differences be-
tween actual fraud and the duty-based misrepresentation fami-
ly of claims, including negligent misrepresentation and fraud 
by omission. Part I examines the legal and historical back-
ground of pleading generally, and the heightened pleading 
standard set forth in Rule 9(b). Part I continues with a review 
of actual fraud and the duty-based claims of negligent misrep-
resentation and fraud by omission. Part II analyzes the purpos-
es of the heightened pleading standard as they relate to duty-
based misrepresentation claims and concludes that the pro-
posed policies that ground heightened pleading for intentional 
fraud claims do not justify particularized pleading for duty-
based misrepresentation claims. Part III discusses the circuit 
split in relation to the guiding principle that Rule 9(b) is cor-
rectly applied where the claim or allegation sounds in fraud. 
Part III continues with a survey of the current formulations 
that define when a claim sounds in fraud and concludes that 
scienter is a required element for an allegation to sound in 
fraud. This Note proposes that causes of action that include sci-
enter and allegations of an intent to deceive sound in fraud and 
should be held to the heightened pleading requirement, while 
  
 
 12. See Republic Bank & Trust Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 683 F.3d 239, 
248 (6th Cir. 2012) (Kentucky law); Trooien v. Mansour, 608 F.3d 1020, 1028 
(8th Cir. 2010) (Minnesota law); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Aniero Concrete Co., 
404 F.3d 566, 579 (2d Cir. 2005); Dist. 1199P Health & Welfare Plan v. 
Janssen, LP, 784 F. Supp. 2d 508, 532 (D.N.J. 2011) (Third Circuit, New Jer-
sey law); Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer E., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 70, 95 (D. Mass. 1998) 
(First Circuit). 
 13. See Balt. Cnty. v. Cigna Healthcare, 238 F. App'x 914, 921 (4th Cir. 
2007); Tricontinental Indus., Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 475 F.3d 
824, 833–34 (7th Cir. 2007) (Illinois law); Am. Realty Trust, Inc. v. Hamilton 
Lane Advisors, Inc., 115 F. App'x 662, 668 (5th Cir. 2004); City of Raton v. 
Ark. River Power Auth., 600 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1143 (D.N.M. 2008) (Tenth Cir-
cuit).  
 14. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); see also infra notes 20–24 and accompanying 
text.  
 15. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b); see also infra notes 45–52 and accompanying text.  
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causes of action that sound in negligence should simply require 
a short and plain statement of the claim.  
I.  THE LEGAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF RULE 
9(b) AND MISREPRESENTATION TORTS   
Analysis of the proper application of Rule 9(b) must be 
grounded in an understanding of pleading generally, the histo-
ry of the heightened pleading standard, and the rationale un-
derlying the particularity requirement. This Part provides that 
background and also examines the elements of fraud, fraud by 
omission, and negligent misrepresentation claims. In addition, 
the application of the heightened pleading standard by the 
courts will be surveyed in relation to each of these causes of ac-
tion.  
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PLEADING  
Understanding the origins of pleading generally informs 
the discussion of how Rule 9(b) applies to duty-based misrepre-
sentation claims. This Section highlights the philosophy under-
pinning the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the function of 
pleadings within that system, the reasoning for the low thresh-
old required for pleadings, and the recent refinement of notice 
pleading in the Supreme Court’s rulings in Bell Atlantic v. 
Twombly16 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.17
The philosophy behind the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure is clearly stated in Rule 1: the rules “should be construed 
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action.”
  
18
The primary purposes of the Federal Rules are to promote 
justice and facilitate adjudication on the merits of the claim.
  
19 
The function of pleadings under Rule 8(a) is to provide notice.20
 
 16. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 
 17. Aschroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 18. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.  
 19. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”); 
see also Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 373 (1966) (“The basic 
purpose of the Federal Rules is to administer justice through fair trials . . . . to 
get away from some of the old procedural booby traps which common-law 
pleaders could set to prevent unsophisticated litigants from ever having their 
day in court.”). See generally 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1029 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing the poli-
cies behind the drafting of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).  
 20. See generally 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDER-
AL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1202 (3d ed. 2004) (“Historically, pleadings 
  
1114 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:1110 
 
The notice model requires, in the majority of cases, only that 
the plaintiff provide a short and plain statement sufficient to 
notify the defendant of the nature of the claim.21 The principal 
draftsman of the Federal Rules commented that what should be 
expected of the pleading was “a general statement distinguish-
ing the case from all others, so that the manner and form of 
trial and remedy expected are clear.”22
The Supreme Court has substantially expanded upon the 
notice model of pleading in recent years. In Bell Atlantic Corp. 
v. Twombly, the Court noted that a plaintiff’s obligation to pro-
vide the grounds of his entitlement to relief “requires more 
than labels and conclusions, and “a formulaic recitation of the 
elements of a cause of action will not do.”
 The fact that the plead-
ing is the gateway to court access justifies this low threshold. 
The idea is not to keep litigants out of court, but to let them in. 
23 Ashcroft v. Iqbal 
elaborated upon this standard, stating that “a complaint must 
contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’” and further com-
mented that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 
pleads factual content” that allows the court to reasonably infer 
the defendant’s liability for the alleged misconduct.24
 
have served four major functions: (1) giving notice of the nature of a claim or 
defense; (2) stating the facts each party believes to exist; (3) narrowing the is-
sues that must be litigated; and (4) providing a means for speedy disposition of 
sham claims and insubstantial defenses.”). But see Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 
F.3d 186, 192–93 (4th Cir. 2009) (stating that the notice pleading characteri-
zation may be too simplistic, belying the countervailing policy that litigation is 
only open to those plaintiffs whose complaints are justified by both law and 
fact). 
 This plau-
sibility standard tailors modern notice pleading, and underlies 
the additional requirements of Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading 
standard.  
 21. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). But cf. Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of No-
tice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 988–89 (2003) (arguing that notice plead-
ing is a myth based on the broad exceptions to the notice standard in various 
substantive areas of the law).  
 22. Charles E. Clark, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Last 
Phase—Underlying Philosophy Embodied in Some of the Basic Provisions of 
the New Procedure, 23 A.B.A. J. 976, 977 (1937). 
 23. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 
 24. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 
at 547). 
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B. PLEADING WITH PARTICULARITY: THE HEIGHTENED 
PLEADING STANDARD OF RULE 9(b) 
An informed analysis of Rule 9(b)’s appropriate application 
to misrepresentation claims requires an understanding of the 
history of the particularity requirement. This Section provides 
the historical background for particularized pleading, the tran-
sition from English common law to the American Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and comments on the gap between the his-
torical rule and the modern application of Rule 9(b) to fraud 
claims. Post hoc rationalizations for the heightened pleading 
standard are laid out as possible bases for this exception to no-
tice pleading found in the Federal Rules.  
1. History of Particularized Pleading  
Rule 9(b)’s heightened standard traces back to English 
common law pleading rules.25 Before the merger of law and eq-
uity, fraud could not be asserted as an equitable defense to an 
action at law.26 Because the litigant had to sue at equity to en-
join enforcement of a law court’s judgment, equity courts re-
quired fraud to be pled with particularity in these cases.27 Dur-
ing this time period, however, pleading fraud as a cause of 
action at law did not require the same particularity.28 At the 
time, the reasoning for the heightened standard stemmed from 
the judicial desire to protect judgments settled in courts of 
law.29 Though the reasoning ceased to fit its application, the 
heightened pleading standard came to be applied to fraud 
claims in the United States around the turn of the twentieth 
century, shortly before the introduction of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.30
 
 25. 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 1296 (3d ed. 2004) (“This specific pleading requirement 
perpetuates the practice that existed at common law . . . .”).  
  
 26. William M. Richman et al., The Pleading of Fraud: Rhymes Without 
Reason, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 959, 966 (1987).  
 27. Id.  
 28. Id. The treatises commented on explicitly state that certain causes of 
action did require specificity, such as slander, but not fraud. See id.  
 29. Christopher M. Fairman, An Invitation to the Rulemakers—Strike 
Rule 9(b), 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281, 285 (2004). 
 30. See, e.g., Chamberlain Mach. Works v. United States, 270 U.S. 347, 
349 (1926) (“To show a cause of action it was necessary that the petition state 
distinctly the particular acts of fraud . . . .”); Rice v. Wilson, 225 F. 159, 163 (D. 
Del. 1915) (“Fraud must be not only particularly alleged but strictly proved.”).  
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Remarkably, very little explicit reasoning substantiates 
the heightened pleading standard as it is announced in the 
Federal Rules. The legislative history on the topic is sparse. 
The Advisory Committee notes relating to the adoption of Rule 
9 are limited to the cryptic message of “[s]ee English Rules Un-
der the Judicature Act (The Annual Practice, 1937) O. 19, r. 
22.”31 It is apparent that the heightened standard is based on 
English procedure, but the Advisory Committee did not provide 
further justifications for adopting this particular rule. Rule 9(b) 
appears in the first draft of the Federal Rules and has never 
been substantively amended.32
The history of the particularity requirement for fraud is 
atypical. There is little connective tissue tying the modern form 
to its historical roots, and yet almost no explanation is provided 
for its inclusion in the Federal Rules. In one of the few com-
ments that relates directly to the heightened pleading stand-
ard, the chief architect of the Federal Rules, Charles E. Clark, 
provided a less-than-illuminating commentary on the purpose 
of the particularity requirement. Regarding Rule 9(b), he stated 
that “[w]hile useful, this rule probably states only what courts 
would do anyhow and may not be considered absolutely essen-
tial.
  
33
2. Post-Hoc Rationalizations of the Particularity Requirement  
 Further explanation is needed for this limiting exception 
to the general notice pleading paradigm. 
Since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the particularity requirement for fraud claims has been ration-
alized on various grounds. Legal scholars and judges alike as-
sert that defendants’ reputations must be protected from light-
ly made allegations of morally reprehensible acts.34 Proponents 
of the heightened pleading standard also argue that defendants 
must be protected from baseless suits filed for nuisance or set-
tlement value.35
 
 31. FED. R. CIV. P. 9. The English rule referred to provides: “Fraud must 
be distinctly alleged and proved. The acts alleged to be fraudulent must be 
stated otherwise no evidence in support of them will be received.” Fairman, 
supra note 
 Another justification for particularized plead-
29, at 287. 
 32. Richman et al., supra note 26, at 965.  
 33. Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2. F.R.D. 456, 463–64 (1943).  
 34. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2003); 4 
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 19, § 1296.  
 35. Adams v. NVR Homes, Inc., 193 F.R.D. 243, 250 (D. Md. 2000); 5A 
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 25, § 1296 (“[U]nfounded fraud claims should 
be identified and disposed of early.”). 
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ing stems from the desire for finality in settled transactions—
transactions should not be easily reopened for an allegation of 
fraud.36 These same scholars claim that to prepare an effective 
defense to a claim which embraces a wide variety of potential 
conduct, a defendant must be put on notice of the act they are 
alleged to have performed.37 The heightened pleading standard 
is also defended as a means to deter the filing of suits solely for 
discovery purposes, in an effort to discover whether unknown 
wrongs have occurred in the course of a transaction.38
C. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF FRAUD  
 In the 
absence of legislative history to indicate the rule’s purpose, the-
se post hoc policies underlying the heightened pleading stand-
ard stand alone as the foundation for Rule 9(b).  
Rule 9(b), by its language, clearly applies to claims of actu-
al fraud. This Section discusses the elements of a cause of ac-
tion for fraud, notes the prominence of scienter as a critical 
component of the tort of fraud, and reviews the application of 
Rule 9(b) by various courts to actual fraud claims. Although the 
specific application of heightened pleading is variable, courts 
consistently require some particularized facts to be alleged in a 
claim of actual fraud.  
A separate cause of action for fraud originated from the in-
dependent tort of deceit.39 This deceit-based history clearly 
points to scienter, the intent to deceive, as the cornerstone ele-
ment in an action for fraud.40
 
 36. In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 325 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 
 The ordinary elements comprising 
a fraud claim are: (1) a false material assertion; (2) scienter; (3) 
the intent to induce reliance on the assertion; (4) justifiable re-
19, § 1296 (“The utility of 
promoting stability in economic transactions has considerable force and might 
be compromised if fraud claims were easy to assert.”). 
 37. Cresencia v. Kim, 878 P.2d 725, 733 (Haw. App. 1994); 5A WRIGHT & 
MILLER, supra note 25, § 1296 (“[A] defendant needs a substantial amount of 
particularized information about the plaintiff's claim in order to enable him to 
understand it and effectively prepare a responsive pleading and an overall de-
fense of the actions.”). 
 38. 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 25, § 1296. 
 39. YOUNG B. SMITH & WILLIAM L. PROSSER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
TORTS (2d ed. 1957), cited in V. John Ella, Common Law Fraud Claims: A 
Critical Tool for Litigators, BENCH & B. MINN., Sept. 2006, at 18, 19.  
 40. See also, Frank J. Cavico, Fraudulent, Negligent, and Innocent Mis-
representation in the Employment Context: The Deceitful, Careless, and 
Thoughtless Employer, 20 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 34 (1997).  
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liance; and (5) damages resulting from the reliance.41 In this 
context, scienter is defined as the intention “to deceive, manip-
ulate, or defraud.”42 The element of scienter differentiates fraud 
from all other misrepresentations.43 Scienter cannot be inferred 
from facts which prove only a materially false or misleading 
statement; rather, there must be a relation of factual falsity to 
a deceptive state of mind.44
When applicable, Rule 9(b) trumps Rule 8(a). Therefore, it 
is Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard that applies to 
claims of fraud, not the bare notice pleading set forth in Rule 
8(a).
 
45 When fraud is alleged, Rule 8(a) is supplemented with 
the requirement that the circumstances be pled with particu-
larity.46 Although courts vary in their precise application of the 
heightened pleading standard to claims of fraud47, a plaintiff 
generally satisfies the particularity requirement by stating who 
made the representation, what was represented, where and 
when the representation was made, and how it was fraudu-
lent.48 The complaint need not enumerate all the evidence or 
plea with such a degree of particularity that general discovery 
methods would be replaced.49
 
 41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 526, 531, 537, 549 (1999).  
 In addition, Rule 9(b) allows in-
tent and other conditions of a person’s mind to be alleged gen-
 42. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). 
 43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1999). Scienter is designated 
as the condition under which a misrepresentation is fraudulent. See id. 
 44. Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 1797 (2010). 
 45. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination 
Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (explaining that unless fraud or mistake are 
alleged, Rule 8(a) notice pleading is the governing standard).  
 46. 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 25, § 1297 (“[T]he rule is a special 
pleading requirement and contrary to the general approach of the ‘short and 
plain,’ simplified pleading . . . .”). 
 47. Compare Abels v. Farmers Commodities Corp., 259 F.3d 910, 921 (8th 
Cir. 2001) (holding that it is only fair to allow discovery before requiring the 
plaintiff to plead facts that remain within the defendant’s knowledge), and 
Corley v. Rosewood Care Ctr., Inc. of Peoria, 142 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir. 
1998) (“[T]he particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) must be relaxed where the 
plaintiff lacks access to all the facts necessary to detail his claim . . . .”), with 
Hayduk v. Lanna, 775 F.2d 441, 444 (1st Cir. 1985) (The particularity re-
quirements must be met, “even when the fraud relates to matters peculiarly 
within the knowledge of the opposing party.” (quoting Wayne Inv., Inc. v. Gulf 
Oil Corp., 739 F.2d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 1984)).  
 48. See United States ex rel. Costner v. United States, 317 F.3d 883, 888 
(8th Cir. 2003).  
 49. Graphic Techs., Inc. v. Pitney Bowes Inc., 998 F. Supp. 1174, 1178 (D. 
Kan. 1998). 
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erally50—scienter need not be pled with specificity.51 However, 
courts have held that the plaintiff must set forth specific facts 
that make it reasonable to believe that the defendants knew 
the statements were false or misleading.52
Courts have found numerous ways for a fraud claim to 
meet the particularity requirement. The First Circuit allowed a 
fraud claim to proceed where the complaint did not describe the 
frauds with sufficient particularity, but the plaintiffs’ opposi-
tion to the motion for summary judgment and related discovery 
material cited gave sufficient notice of the fraudulent acts al-
leged . . . .”
 
53
The Third Circuit also carved out an exception to the par-
ticularity requirement, holding that the date, place, and time of 
the fraud need not be alleged, as long as the plaintiff uses “an 
‘alternative means of injecting precision and some measure of 
substantiation into their allegations of fraud.’”
  
54
Courts are equally creative when dismissing a complaint 
on particularity grounds. One court dismissed a complaint, de-
spite the fact it described a speaker’s statements with particu-
larity, holding that “January, 1996” does not allege the time of 
the statement in a sufficiently particular manner.
 
55 Others 
have held that the complaint must contain specific identifica-
tion of documents comprising the false statements.56 These var-
iations in procedure lead to frustration for parties, judges, and 
legal scholars alike.57
 
 50. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 Yet, these relatively minor difficulties in 
applying heightened pleading to actual fraud claims are magni-
fied when it comes to pleading related, yet distinct, causes of 
 51. Id. 
 52. In re Segue Software, Inc. Sec. Litig., 106 F. Supp. 2d 161, 165 (D. 
Mass. 2000).  
 53. Bonilla v. Trebol Motors Corp., 150 F.3d 77, 81 (1st Cir. 1998).  
 54. Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644, 658 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (quoting Seville Indus. Mach. v. Southmost Mach., 742 F.2d 786, 
791 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
 55. Learning Express, Inc. v. Ray-Matt Enters., 74 F. Supp. 2d 79, 85 (D. 
Mass. 1999). 
 56. Elster v. Alexander, 75 F.R.D. 458, 461–62 (N.D. Ga. 1977). 
 57. E.g., In re Commonwealth Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Corp. Sec. Litig., 467 
F. Supp. 227, 250 (W.D. Tex. 1979) (“No court has enunciated a [particularity] 
test which casts light beyond the facts before it.”); Jeff Sovern, Reconsidering 
Federal Civil Rule 9(b): Do We Need Particularized Pleading Requirements in 
Fraud Cases?, 104 F.R.D. 143, 179 (1985) (“Rule 9(b) should be eliminated 
from the federal civil rules. . . . Too often, Rule 9(b) motions are just another 
obstacle to the speedy resolution of a case.”). 
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action that are not enumerated in the text of Rule 9(b), and at 
their heart are grounded in duty rather than scienter.  
D. DUTY-BASED MISREPRESENTATION: A PRIMER ON FRAUD BY 
OMISSION AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATIONS 
American jurisprudence recognizes a continuum for claims 
of misrepresentation. At one end is actual fraud, based in scien-
ter.58 At the opposite end of the spectrum are innocent misrep-
resentation claims that do not require either knowledge that 
the misrepresentation was false or intent to induce reliance on 
the misrepresentation.59 Roughly in the center of the continu-
um are misrepresentations that are based in duty, such as 
fraud by omission and negligent misrepresentation.60
1. Fraud by Omission 
 This Sec-
tion discusses both fraud by omission and negligent misrepre-
sentation claims, focusing on the elements of each tort and the 
courts’ application of Rule 9(b) to each cause of action.  
Unlike actual fraud, which hinges on an affirmative mis-
statement, a fraud by omission claim is grounded in an unful-
filled duty to disclose.61 To prevail on a fraud by omission claim, 
the plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant had a duty to 
disclose the material fact at issue; (2) the defendant failed to 
disclose the fact; (3) the defendant’s failure to disclose the ma-
terial fact induced the plaintiff to act; and (4) the plaintiff suf-
fered actual damages as a result of the nondisclosure.62 Fraud 
by omission is sometimes conflated with fraudulent conceal-
ment.63 However, fraudulent concealment requires the addi-
tional element of scienter, which is not an element of fraud by 
omission.64
The duty to disclose arises in a variety of situations. There 
are at least three types of relationships which can give rise to a 
 The two claims are neither equivalent nor inter-
changeable.  
 
 58. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 107, 741 (5th ed. 1984). 
 59. Id. at 748‒49. 
 60. Addressing the proper pleading standard for innocent misrepresenta-
tions is beyond the scope of this paper.  
 61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1999). 
 62. Id. § 551.  
 63. See Breeden v. Richmond Cmty. Coll., 171 F.R.D. 189, 194 (M.D.N.C. 
1997) (using fraud by omission and fraudulent concealment interchangeably).  
 64. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Aniero Concrete Co., 404 F.3d 566, 582 (2d 
Cir. 2005). 
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duty to disclose material facts. The first is a formal fiduciary 
relationship,65 the second is a confidential relationship,66 and 
the third is a trilogy created in arm’s length transactions.67
In contrast to affirmative representations, fraud by omis-
sion can be very difficult to plead with particularity. By its very 
nature, it is a claim of non-action. It is puzzling to explain how 
a plaintiff can plead who, what, where, how, and when a non-
action occurred. No courts have completely abrogated the ne-
cessity for pleading with particularity, but a fraud by omission 
claim can succeed without the same degree of specificity that 
an actual fraud claim requires.
  
68
The pleading standard required in a fraud by omission 
claim is varied. Some courts require that a plaintiff claiming 
fraud by omission need only allege the facts that were not dis-
closed and the source of the duty to speak with particularity.
  
69 
Other courts require the complaint to reasonably allege what 
the omission entailed, the person responsible for the failure to 
disclose, the context of the omissions and the manner in which 
they misled the plaintiff, and what the defendant obtained 
through the omission.70
 
 65. Id.; D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 
55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1412 (2002) (“Formal fiduciary relationships are those 
well-settled cases—such as trustee-beneficiary, guardian-ward, partner-
partner, director-shareholder, and attorney-client—where fiduciary duties ap-
ply as a matter of course.”). 
 One court has expanded this require-
ment to include particularity regarding the relationship giving 
rise to the duty to speak, the reason for the materiality of the 
omission, and why reliance on the omission was both reasona-
 66. Smith, supra note 65, at 1412–14 (“Informal fiduciary relationships—
often referred to as ‘confidential relationships’—are those in which the court 
imposes fiduciary duties based on a qualitative evaluation of the relation-
ship . . . . [T]he common elements are quite simple: (1) ‘trust’ or ‘confidence’ 
reposed by one person in another; and (2) the resulting ‘domination,’ ‘superior-
ity,’ or ‘undue influence’ of the other.”). 
 67. “(1) When one voluntarily discloses information, he has a duty to dis-
close the whole truth; (2) when one makes a representation, he has a duty to 
disclose new information when he is aware the new information makes the 
earlier representation misleading or untrue; and (3) when one makes a partial 
disclosure and conveys a false impression, he has a duty to speak.” Four Bros. 
Boat Works, Inc. v. Tesoro Petroleum Co., 217 S.W.3d 653, 670–71 (Tex. App. 
2006). 
 68. Falk v. Gen. Motors Corp., 496 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1099 (N.D. Cal. 
2007). 
 69. 27 FED. PROC., L. ED. § 62:146 (2008).  
 70. Weaver v. Chrysler Corp., 172 F.R.D. 96, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Adler v. 
Berg Harmon Assocs., 816 F. Supp. 919, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).  
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ble and detrimental.71 Still other courts hold that “relaxed Rule 
9(b) analysis” applies to claims of fraud by omission.72
2. Negligent Misrepresentation 
  
Negligent misrepresentation claims are governed by the 
principles of negligence: reasonableness, duty, breach, and 
damages. Negligent misrepresentation does not contain the re-
quirement of an intent to deceive and is “therefore technically 
not fraud.”73 It is also unlike fraud by omission in that the duty 
owed arises only in a transactional context, rather than from a 
special relationship between the parties.74
The archetypal elements of negligent misrepresentation 
are: (1) the misrepresentation must be made in the course of 
business, profession, or employment, or another transaction in 
which the speaker has a pecuniary interest; (2) the representa-
tion must supply false information; (3) there must have been 
justifiable reliance on the false information supplied; and (4) 
the party accused of the misrepresentation must have failed to 
exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or com-
municating the information.
  
75 The scope of negligent misrepre-
sentation is narrow because it is premised on the reasonable 
expectations of a foreseeable user of information supplied in a 
transactional context.76
The Circuit Courts have vastly divergent views over the 
appropriate pleading standard for negligent misrepresentation 
claims. The different pleading standards arise from a funda-
mental philosophical difference in the way the Circuits view 
negligent misrepresentation. Those that apply Rule 9(b) hold 
that negligent misrepresentation claims are claims of fraud, or 
  
 
 71. Breeden v. Richmond Cmty. Coll., 171 F.R.D. 189, 195 (M.D.N.C. 
1997). 
 72. Robinson v. Fountainhead Title Grp. Corp., 447 F. Supp. 2d 478, 490 
(D. Md. 2006).  
 73. R. Joseph Barton, Drowning in a Sea of Contract: Application of the 
Economic Loss Rule to Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims, 41 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1789, 1820 (2000) (distinguishing negligent misrepresentation 
from fraud based on the lack of a “concomitant element of an actual intent to 
deceive”); V. John Ella, Common Law Fraud Claims: A Critical Tool for Litiga-
tors, BENCH & B. MINN., Sept. 2006, at 18, 20. But see 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 74 
(2013) (“An action for negligent misrepresentation is an action for fraud.”). 
 74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1999).  
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at cmt. a.  
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sound in fraud; those who apply Rule 8(a) hold that they are 
claims of negligence, not grounded in fraud.77
In holding that the heightened pleading standard does not 
apply to claims of negligent misrepresentation, courts have ar-
gued that negligent misrepresentation “does not contain an es-
sential showing of fraud”;
  
78 “is not governed by . . . Rule 9(b)”;79 
is not enumerated in Rule 9(b);80 and “as its name suggests, [is] 
grounded in negligence rather than fraud.”81 By comparison, in 
holding that the heightened pleading standard does apply to 
negligent misrepresentation, courts have argued that an alle-
gation of negligent misrepresentation is simply an allegation of 
fraud82 or that an action for negligent misrepresentation sounds 
in fraud rather than negligence.83
The Sixth Circuit and Ninth Circuits are exceptions to the-
se general rules.
 
84 In an anomalous combination of philoso-
phies, the Sixth Circuit acknowledges that Kentucky law sug-
gests that negligent misrepresentation is not an allegation of 
fraud, yet still holds that the heightened pleading standard ap-
plies because such an allegation implicates Rule 9(b)’s pur-
pose.85 The Ninth Circuit relies primarily on the conduct al-
leged, rather than the nature of the claim to determine whether 
heightened pleading is necessary. Allegations “of fraudulent 
conduct must satisfy the heightened pleading requirements of 
Rule 9(b). Allegations of non-fraudulent conduct need satisfy 
only the ordinary notice pleading standards of Rule 8(a).”86
The history of the heightened pleading standard and the 
justifications surrounding its adoption into the Federal Rules 
do not provide much guidance for courts applying Rule 9(b) to 
misrepresentation claims. The historical basis for Rule 9(b) 
  
 
 77. See infra notes 78–83 and accompanying text.  
 78. Baltimore Cnty. v. Cigna Healthcare, 238 F. App'x 914, 921 (4th Cir. 
2007). 
 79. Tricontinental Indus., Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 475 F.3d 
824, 833 (7th Cir. 2007).  
 80. Am. Realty Trust, Inc. v. Hamilton Lane Advisors, Inc., 115 F. App'x 
662, 668 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 81. City of Raton v. Ark. River Power Auth., 600 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1143 
(D.N.M. 2008). 
 82. Trooien v. Mansour, 608 F.3d 1020, 1028 (8th Cir. 2010).  
 83. Souran v. Travelers Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 1497, 1511 (11th Cir. 1993).  
 84. See infra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.  
 85. Republic Bank & Trust Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 683 F.3d 239, 247–
48 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 86. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1105 (9th Cir. 2003).  
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heightened pleading in fraud claims is uncertain.87
II.  ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICATION OF THE 
PARTICULARITY REQUIREMENT TO DUTY-BASED 
MISREPRESENTATION CLAIMS   
 With this 
backdrop of historical and post-hoc heightened pleading ration-
ales, federal courts apply Rule 9(b) differently for fraud, fraud 
by omission, and negligent misrepresentation. For fraud by 
omission and negligent misrepresentation, courts are split on 
whether to apply notice pleading or Rule 9(b). A clear standard 
is needed to apprise plaintiffs of the requirements for their 
pleading and to guide courts in their determination of the ap-
propriate pleading standard.  
Shaping a workable pleading standard for duty-based mis-
representation claims entails an analysis of the claims’ ele-
ments and how the elements relate to the purposes of the 
heightened pleading standard set forth in Rule 9(b). Courts 
have clearly determined that the making of a false statement is 
not per se a matter that Rule 9(b) requires to be specially 
pleaded.88 Thus the pleading standard for each type of misrep-
resentation claim must be determined by reference to the ele-
ment in each that differentiates it from the others. The critical 
component of a fraud claim is scienter.89 The crux of a fraud by 
omission claim is the special relationship between the parties 
that gives rise to a duty to disclose.90 The root of a negligent 
misrepresentation claim is that the defendant failed to exercise 
reasonable care in obtaining and communicating information in 
a transactional context.91
The following sections analyze the four most oft-repeated 
policy arguments for the heightened pleading standard in light 
of the key components of fraud, fraud by omission, and negli-
gent misrepresentation. This Part argues that the Circuit split 
belies general adherence to a vague standard used to fix the 
pleading standard. The principle underpinning the apparent 
split holds that allegations that sound in fraud are properly 
  
 
 87. See supra Part I.B. 
 88. John P. Villano Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 130, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(“[N]othing in the language or history of Rule 9(b) suggests that it is intended 
to apply, willy-nilly, to every . . . tort that includes an element of false state-
ment.”).  
 89. See supra Part I.C.  
 90. See supra Part I.D.1.  
 91. See supra Part I.D.2. 
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governed by Rule 9(b) while allegations that are grounded in 
negligence only need to satisfy Rule 8(a). 
A. FINALITY OF SETTLED TRANSACTIONS DICTATES THAT THEY 
SHOULD NOT BE LIGHTLY REOPENED FOR AN ALLEGATION OF 
FRAUD 
The historic explanation for the heightened pleading re-
quirement for fraud claims is to protect judgments and settled 
transactions.92 Protecting settled transactions is not a persua-
sive reason to require heightened pleading for duty-based 
claims. Legal scholars have noted that Rule 9(b) “probably orig-
inated in equity pleading and reflected a reluctance to upset or 
investigate judgments, settled accounts and other completed 
transactions.”93 This policy has its roots in the historical ra-
tionale for heightened pleading in the English jurisprudential 
separation between courts of equity and courts of law.94 Since 
the merger of the two, fraud is no longer raised as defense to 
the judgment of a court of law in a separate court of equity, so 
the historical rationale is inapplicable.95
A modern corollary justification has been asserted for the 
historical heightened pleading policy. Charges of fraud fre-
quently request courts to rewrite the parties’ contract or other-
wise disrupt established contractual relationships.
  
96 Since 
“[t]he utility of promoting stability in economic transactions 
has considerable force and might be compromised if fraud 
claims were easy to assert,”97 some courts are reluctant to reo-
pen settled transactions without particularized pleading for 
fraud cases.98
This justification takes for granted that stability in eco-
nomic transactions would be undermined by the mere pleading 
of fraud. Even though stability in economic transactions could 
be undermined by the setting aside of numerous transactions 
  
 
 92. John P. Villano, 176 F.R.D. at 131. 
 93. Richman et al., supra note 26, at 967.  
 94. John P. Villano, 176 F.R.D. at 131. (“The requirement traces back to 
common law presumptions of caveat emptor and to the reluctance of English 
courts to reopen settled transactions.”).  
 95. See supra Part I.B.  
 96. Ackerman v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 172 F.3d 467, 469 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 97. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 20, at § 1296. 
 98. See, e.g., Stearns v. Page, 48 U.S. 819, 829 (1849). Particularity is re-
quired for fraud claims that seek to reopen a settled transaction “so that the 
court may rectify it with a feeling of certainty that they are not committing 
another, and perhaps greater, mistake.” See id.  
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based on fraudulent conduct, this would tend to deter parties 
from transacting in a fraudulent manner, a respectable result. 
For duty-based misrepresentations, it is even more difficult to 
assess how pleading the claim alone could destabilize economic 
transactions. Additionally, modern courts are much more will-
ing to reopen settled transactions than they once were, espe-
cially in the context of misrepresentations.99
B. THE DEFENDANTS’ REPUTATION MUST BE PROTECTED FROM 
CLAIMS THAT MORALLY REPREHENSIBLE ACTS HAVE BEEN 
COMMITTED 
 Therefore, further 
justification of the heightened pleading requirement is neces-
sary for its application to duty-based misrepresentation claims.  
The most consistently recited purpose of Rule 9(b) is to pro-
tect the defendant’s reputation.100 The necessity of protecting a 
defendant’s reputation is recognized in cases of actual fraud. 
Claiming that a defendant intended to deceive, manipulate, or 
mislead a plaintiff is a weighty allegation that could cause seri-
ous harm to a defendant’s reputation and goodwill. It would be 
prejudicial to allow plaintiffs to allege unfounded claims of 
fraud where the allegation alone could harm the defendant’s 
reputation or business.101
Although this policy plainly applies to fraud claims, its ap-
plication to duty-based misrepresentation claims is less clear 
since, by their nature, they lack the same level of moral repre-
hensibility. In addition, Rule 9(b) does not deter plaintiffs from 
filing complaints due to its unpredictable application.
  
102 Moreo-
ver, dismissal on Rule 9(b) grounds may not vindicate a de-
fendant’s reputation, as the dismissal is likely to be viewed as 
dismissal on a technicality, rather than on the merits.103
 
 99. Note, Pleading Securities Fraud Claims with Particularity Under Rule 
9(b), 97 HARV. L. REV. 1432, 1439 (1984) (“[C]ontemporary courts generally do 
not even express concern about reopening completed transactions.”). 
  
 100. E.g., Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 171 (2d Cir. 2004); Vess v. Ci-
ba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2003); S2 Automation LLC 
v. Micron Tech., Inc., 281 F.R.D. 487, 494 (D.N.M. 2012). 
 101. Richard G. Himelrick, Pleading Securities Fraud, 43 MD. L. REV. 342, 
368–69 (1984) (“Suggestions of fraud tarnish reputations and denigrate the 
goodwill of businesses. Professionals are particularly vulnerable to these 
charges. Irreparable loss of standing and prestige may befall [one] who is 
linked with a fraudulent scheme through attenuated allegations that may 
take years to disprove.”).  
 102. See Sovern, supra note 57, at 171–72. 
 103. Id. at 173 (arguing that reputational protection is not a sufficient poli-
cy on which to base heightened pleading in fraud cases).  
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In addition, Rule 9(b) may not protect the reputations and 
goodwill of defendants because the unpredictability of the 
Rule’s application does not deter plaintiffs from filing com-
plaints. Arguably, once the complaint has been filed, the harm 
has been done. But Rule 9(b) will not function as an effective 
deterrent if it is not applied effectively and uniformly.104 Rule 
9(b)’s application is unpredictable at best, not only for claims of 
negligent misrepresentation and fraud by omission, but even in 
claims of actual fraud.105
Most significantly, the derogation of a duty does not carry 
the moral opprobrium associated with an explicit intent to de-
ceive, regardless of whether the setting is purely transactional, 
as in a negligent misrepresentation claim, or the setting is de-
fined by a confidential or fiduciary relationship, in a fraud by 
omission claim. Even if defendants counter that these duty-
based claims do carry some reputational damage, torts such as 
battery and intentional infliction of severe emotional distress 
carry far more moral reprehensibility, yet a heightened plead-
ing standard is not applied to those claims.
 Because of the lack of a clear standard 
by which to measure an allegation of negligent misrepresenta-
tion or fraud by omission, a plaintiff will often be unable to de-
termine whether the complaint will satisfy the particularity re-
quirements. Thus, application of the heightened pleading 
standard to duty-based misrepresentation claims is unlikely to 
deter plaintiffs from filing claims based on these causes of ac-
tion.  
106
C. DEFENDANTS MUST BE PROTECTED FROM BASELESS SUITS 
FILED FOR NUISANCE OR SETTLEMENT VALUE  
 Although this pol-
icy may justify heightened pleading in cases of actual fraud, 
reputational harm alone is not a sufficient justification for re-
quiring particularized pleading for duty-based misrepresenta-
tion claims.  
Numerous courts have asserted that a principal aim of 
Rule 9(b) is to preclude the use of groundless fraud claims as a 
 
 104. Id. at 171–72. 
 105. See supra Parts I.C‒I.D.  
 106. Intentional infliction of severe emotional distress claims require that 
the conduct “must be so extreme in degree and so outrageous in character as 
to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and be regarded as atrocious and 
utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Williamson v. Am. Nat’l. Ins. Co., 
695 F. Supp. 2d 431, 456 (S.D. Tex. 2010). Heightened pleading is required on-
ly for claims of fraud and mistake. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).  
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pretext to discovering a wrong or as a strike suit.107 Courts con-
tend that “Rule 9[(b)] operates to diminish the possibility that a 
plaintiff with a largely groundless claim will be able to simply 
take up the time of [defendants] . . . with the right to do so rep-
resenting an in terrorem increment of the settlement val-
ue . . . .”108 Defendants should be protected from strike suits; 
however, protecting the defendant from baseless suits is not the 
business of Rule 9(b).109
Courts are most lenient with the particularity requirement 
in those precise instances where this policy presupposes they 
should be most rigid, where information is uniquely within the 
possession of the alleged misrepresenter.
  
110 Additionally, as this 
justification relates to fraud by omission, the key element is the 
duty to disclose due to a special relationship.111 Discovery is not 
likely to yield this information where it is not already available 
to the complaining party.112
 
 107. E.g., New Eng. Data Servs., Inc. v. Becher, 829 F.2d 286, 289 (1st Cir. 
1987); Driscoll v. Landmark Bank for Sav., 758 F. Supp. 48, 52 (D. Mass. 
1991). A “strike suit” is an action making largely groundless claims to justify 
conducting extensive and costly discovery with the hope of forcing the defend-
ant to settle at a premium to avoid the costs of the discovery. See BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1572 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a strike suit as one “based on no val-
id claim, brought either for nuisance value or as leverage to obtain a favorable 
or inflated settlement”). 
 Therefore, this policy does not sub-
stantiate particularized pleading for claims of fraud by omis-
sion. For negligent misrepresentation claims, the critical ele-
ment to be alleged is dereliction of a duty in comparison to a 
 108. Wayne Inv., Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 739 F.2d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 1984) 
(quoting Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.1979)). 
 109. Rule 12(b)(6) is specifically suited to this purpose. Yoichiro Hamabe, 
Functions of Rule 12(b)(6) in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: A Categori-
zation Approach, 15 CAMPBELL L. REV. 119, 127–28 (1993) (stating that the 
purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint, 
achieve early resolution of cases on the merits, and resolve and screen out 
unmeritorious cases at the pleading stage).  
 110. Peters v. Amoco Oil Co., 57 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1280 (M.D. Ala. 1999) 
(holding that the heightened pleading requirement of Rule 9(b) “may be re-
laxed somewhat if the defendant controls information required for proper 
pleading” (quoting United States ex rel. Sanders v. E. Ala. Healthcare Auth., 
953 F. Supp. 1404, 1413 (M.D. Ala. 1996))); United States ex rel. Stinson, Ly-
ons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ga., Inc., 755 F. 
Supp. 1040, 1052 (S.D. Ga. 1990) (noting that the particularity requirement of 
Rule 9(b) “is relaxed somewhat” when the factual information is “peculiarly 
within the defendant’s knowledge or control”). 
 111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1999). 
 112. Cf. Falk v. Gen. Motors Corp., 496 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1098–99 (N.D. 
Cal. 2007) (noting that pleading fraud by omission will be more difficult be-
cause of the nature of the claim). 
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standard of reasonableness in a transactional setting.113
There are other, more effective means of protecting de-
fendants from baseless suits, such as Rules 11, 12(b)(6), 12(c), 
and 56. Rule 11 requires that that the parties and/or attorneys 
certify that the pleading is not being presented for any improp-
er purpose, thus regulating the filing of strike suits by impos-
ing sanctions, which may include attorney’s fees, on parties 
who file for improper purposes.
 Again, 
discovery will not magically generate this duty if the plaintiff 
cannot first establish it.  
114 Under Rule 12(b)(6), dismis-
sal is appropriate where the plaintiff has failed to state a legit-
imate claim upon which relief can be granted.115 Rule 12(c) al-
lows for a judgment on the pleadings, requiring, much like Rule 
12(b)(6), that the complaint “contain[s] factual allegations that 
raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the as-
sumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true.”116 
Summary judgment is also available to deal with strike suits 
under Rule 56, where discovery does not uncover sufficient evi-
dence upon which to base the claim.117
The numerous avenues for protecting defendants from nui-
sance suits diminish the potency of this policy’s requirement for 
heightened pleading. It may be argued that there is purposeful 
overlap in the functions of the Federal Rules; just because there 
are other Rules that protect against strike suits does not mean 
that Rule 9(b) cannot also be used.
  
118 Similar to the need to pro-
tect a defendant’s reputation, strike suits are an issue not only 
for fraud claims, but for a wide variety of claims.119
 
 113. See supra notes 
 Basing the 
particularity requirement on the desire to limit strike suits in 
this specific context goes beyond the suitable scope of Rule 9(b), 
since limiting strike suits is comprehensively dealt with in oth-
74–76 and accompanying text. 
 114. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). The improper purposes enumerated in the Rule 
include harassment, “caus[ing] unnecessary delay, or needlessly increas[ing] 
the cost of litigation.” Id. These improper purposes are not exhaustive, rather 
they are illustrative. Id. Filing for settlement value would likely fit within the 
scope of this Rule. 
 115. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).  
 116. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). See Pérez-Acevedo v. Rivero-Cubano, 520 F.3d 
26, 29 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 117. FED. R. CIV. P. 56.  
 118. See Sovern, supra note 57, at 176 (“[I]f Rule 11 is only partially effec-
tive in preventing strike suits, as is likely to be the case, Rule 9(b) may still be 
thought to have a role to play.”). 
 119. Richman, supra note 26, at 962‒63. 
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er Rules.120
D. DEFENDANTS REQUIRE SUFFICIENT NOTICE OF THE WRONG 
ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED 
 The complications in relying on this justification for 
application of the heightened pleading standard to fraud claims 
are exponentially increased in the context of duty-based mis-
representation claims, as they are not specifically enumerated 
in the Rule. A more persuasive justification is needed to firmly 
ground Rule 9(b)’s application to duty-based misrepresentation 
claims.  
Given that notice is the singular policy underlying pleading 
generally, it is unsurprising that notice has been relied on as a 
justification for the heightened pleading standard in Rule 9(b). 
Courts have framed this purpose in various ways. Some state 
that the defendant must be given enough information to pre-
pare an effective response121 or must be advised of the specific 
claim that it must meet.122 Others frame the issue such that the 
allegations must sufficiently apprise the defendants of the 
transactions upon which the claim is based.123
Historically, pleadings fulfill “several overlapping purpos-
es”: pure notice of the claim, narrowing the issues “so that liti-
gants can ascertain what matters are actually in dispute,” serv-
ing as a “permanent record” and “basis for res judicata,” 
providing for the “speedy disposition of frivolous claims and de-
fenses,” and “to permit disposition of cases without trial where 
the facts are not in issue.”
  
124 But, under American notice plead-
ing, the pleading is only intended to provide enough infor-
mation so that the opposing party is alerted to the nature of the 
claim.125 The other functions are performed through motion 
practice and discovery.126
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal have 
precluded plaintiffs from moving forward with suits that fail to 
sufficiently give notice of the claim, for all causes of action, not 
  
 
 120. See, e.g., supra note 109 and accompanying text (arguing that Rule 
12(b)(6) is an effective way to prevent strike suits). 
 121. Ross v. A. H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 557–58 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 122. United States v. Gill, 156 F. Supp. 955, 957 (W.D. Pa. 1957). 
 123. B & B Inv. Club v. Kleinert’s, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 720, 727 (E.D. Pa. 
1975).  
 124. Sovern, supra note 57, at 147–48.  
 125. See supra Part I.A. 
 126. Sovern, supra note 57, at 147–48. 
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just in misrepresentation claims.127 This is achieved by requir-
ing a pleading to contain more than a formulaic recitation of 
the elements of the cause of action, and to allege sufficient fac-
tual matter that allows the court to reasonably infer the de-
fendant’s liability.128 Therefore, relying on the notice justifica-
tion for the heightened pleadings standard is unnecessary for 
duty-based misrepresentation claims. The tailoring of notice 
pleading has raised the bar for the notice requirements such 
that any allegation of duty-based misrepresentation would, by 
meeting the current pleading standard governed by Twombly 
and Iqbal, give the defendant sufficient information on which to 
fashion a defense.129 Some courts have already agreed that the 
purpose of Rule 9(b) is not to give the defendant enough infor-
mation to prepare his defense, “[a] charge of fraud is no more 
opaque than any other charge.”130
In fact, justifying heightened pleading by the same policy 
as notice pleading takes the wind out of the sails of heightened 
pleading. If pure notice pleading adequately serves the desired 
function, there is no need for heightened pleading at all, not for 
intentional fraud, and certainly not for negligent misrepresen-
tation or fraud by omission. Indeed, there is some irony that 
the notice rationale, designed as it was to facilitate entry to the 
courts, would be used as a justification to dismiss claims before 
they can even be heard.
 
131
E. ALLEGATIONS THAT SOUND IN FRAUD 
  
The Circuit split regarding the appropriate pleading 
standard for negligent misrepresentation claims is not as wide 
as the contrary decisions lead one to believe. There are a few 
courts that baldly assert that Rule 9(b) applies to both negli-
gent misrepresentation claims and fraud by omission claims in 
every circumstance, relying purely on the similarities between 
duty-based misrepresentation and intentional misrepresenta-
tions.132
 
 127. See infra note 
 However, the majority of courts rely on a central prin-
128. 
 128. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 
(2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 
 129. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text. 
 130. Ackerman v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 172 F.3d 467, 469 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(“The defendant can get all the information he needs to meet it by filing a con-
tention interrogatory.”).  
 131. Fairman, supra note 29, at 297.  
 132. See Breeden v. Richmond Cmty. Coll., 171 F.R.D. 189, 202 (M.D.N.C. 
1997) (holding that Rule 9(b) applies to negligent misrepresentation because 
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ciple in issuing their inconsistent opinions. The principle un-
derlying these decisions states that if a complaint alleges a 
claim that sounds in fraud, then Rule 9(b)’s particularity re-
quirements obtain; if a complaint alleges a claim that sounds in 
negligence, then Rule 8(a)’s lower threshold applies.133
There are two techniques for determining whether an alle-
gation sounds in fraud. The Eleventh Circuit determined that 
when the facts underlying a negligence claim are also “part of a 
fraud claim,” the negligence claim sounds in fraud.
 This 
Section argues that the underlying principle relied on, sound-
ing in fraud, is so vague that it has become meaningless. The 
lack of meaning underlying the phrase “sounding in fraud” re-
sults in inconsistencies within and among both the circuits and 
state courts.  
134 This posi-
tion holds that when fraud and negligent misrepresentation are 
alleged side by side and there is an overlap of supporting facts, 
both claims must be pled with particularity.135 However, it 
seems incorrect to determine the appropriate pleading stand-
ard of one claim by reference to separately alleged claims in the 
complaint. Duty-based misrepresentation claims “do not be-
come subject to heightened pleading simply because they are 
based on the same set of operative facts as corresponding fraud 
claims.”136 The Ninth Circuit holds that when a plaintiff alleges 
a “unified course of fraudulent conduct . . . as the basis of the 
claim,” the claim sounds in fraud.137
 
“the major component involves significant delusion or confusion of a party, 
whether intentional or not”); Lindner Dividend Fund, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, 
880 F. Supp. 49, 57 (D. Mass. 1995) (“[T]his district has clearly held that Rule 
9(b) applies to claims of negligent misrepresentations.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 This second method of de-
termining when a claim sounds in fraud can hardly be wrong, 
but the circularity of reasoning gives it no meaningful force. It 
is self-evident that when you allege fraud, the allegation 
sounds in fraud.  
 133. E.g., Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
 134. Wagner v. First Horizon Pharm. Corp., 464 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir. 
2006). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Am. Realty Trust, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 362 F. 
Supp. 2d 744, 749 (N.D. Tex. 2005). 
 137. Vess, 317 F.3d at 1103. 
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The difficulties in determining whether a claim sounds in 
fraud are undeniable.138
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the asserted jus-
tifications for the heightened pleading requirement are an in-
sufficient basis for its application to duty-based misrepresenta-
tion claims.
 Given the unhelpful articulations pre-
sented by the courts, there is need for a clear determining 
standard for what it means for an allegation to sound in fraud. 
Especially in the case of negligent misrepresentation claims, 
which are closely related, yet distinct from fraud, without a 
clear standard the plaintiff is left to guess whether particulari-
ty will be required for the claim. The current formulations re-
sult only in added confusion. 
139 The modern equivalent of the historical 
justification, desire for finality in settled transactions, does not 
support applying the heightened pleading requirement to duty-
based claims.140 The primary policy underlying the heightened 
pleading standard, protecting a defendant’s reputation and 
goodwill, is likewise an insufficient basis.141 Unlike claims of 
fraud, the dereliction of a duty does not carry the moral repre-
hensibility associated with an explicit intent to deceive; there-
fore this policy does not require particularized pleading for du-
ty-based claims. Protecting defendants from meritless suits 
filed for nuisance or settlement value is properly handled by 
other Federal Rules, and to add that purpose to Rules govern-
ing pleading is not only redundant, but beyond the scope of 
Rule 9(b).142 Finally, this analysis demonstrated that grounding 
the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) on the desire for suf-
ficient notice of the nature of the claim is unnecessary, as Rule 
8(a)’s short and plain statement of the claim provides notice to 
the defendant of the nature of the claim.143
Although this analysis clearly leans away from requiring 
particularized pleading for duty-based misrepresentation 
claims, this Note does not propose that allegations of negligent 
misrepresentation and fraud by omission are completely ex-
cluded from Rule 9(b). Many courts have spoken decisively on 
  
 
 138. See Fairman, supra note 29, at 301–05 (“Rule 9(b) is contagious. It in-
fects other substantive areas with its heightened pleading standard.”). 
 139. See supra Parts II.A‒D. 
 140. See supra Part II.A. 
 141. See supra Part II.B. 
 142. See supra Part II.C. 
 143. See supra Part II.D. 
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this matter144 and they are not all mistaken. However, the Cir-
cuit split regarding the correct pleading standard for negligent 
misrepresentation claims and the inconsistencies in the re-
quired particulars for fraud by omission claims point to the lack 
of a clear standard by which these claims should be judged.145
III.  SCIENTER IS REQUIRED FOR A CLAIM OR 
ALLEGATION TO SOUND IN FRAUD   
 
Part III takes up this discussion and proposes a clear standard 
for courts to use in applying heightened pleading to duty-based 
misrepresentation claims.  
The growing divergence of authority over the proper plead-
ing standard for duty-based misrepresentation claims leaves 
the door open for the emergence of a clear pleading standard 
that is broadly applicable. This Part critiques the formulations 
of the standard used to determine that a claim sounds in fraud, 
analyzes how it breeds inconsistencies in application, and ulti-
mately concludes that inclusion of an allegation of scienter is 
the correct determinant for whether a claim sounds in fraud.  
A. SCIENTER: WHAT IT REALLY MEANS TO SOUND IN FRAUD 
An articulable test is needed to differentiate those claims 
that sound in fraud from those that do not. The best source of 
guidance in structuring that test is analyzing the essential at-
tributes of a fraud claim. Courts have made it clear that fraud 
and other forms of misrepresentation are not co-extensive, ei-
ther in scope, liability, or pleading standard.146 As a result, that 
feature which sets fraud apart from other misrepresentations 
must be the determinant of fraud.147 The defining characteristic 
of a fraud claim is scienter, the one element that sets fraud 
apart from every other misrepresentation.148
 
 144. See supra notes 
 An allegation that 
sounds in fraud is an allegation of scienter concerning the mis-
representation. Scienter allegations are sufficiently particular 
if supported by facts giving rise to a strong inference of fraudu-
68–72, 79–86, and accompanying text.  
 145. See supra notes 68–72, 79–86, and accompanying text.  
 146. See supra Part I. 
 147. Reno v. Bull, 124 N.E. 144, 145 (N.Y. 1919) (“Fraud presupposes a 
willful purpose resorted to with intent to deprive another of his legal 
rights . . . . Fraud always has its origin in a purpose, but negligence is an 
omission of duty minus the purpose.” (citations omitted)). 
 148. See supra Part I.C.  
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lent intent.149
This new standard is discordant in some respects with the 
current constructions in practice.
 
150 However, given the lack of 
guidance inherent in the current formulations, that does not re-
flect poorly on the new standard, quite the opposite. That the 
facts supporting a fraud claim also support a negligence claim 
should not determine whether the negligence claim sounds in 
fraud unless the facts that support the claim implicate intent to 
deceive, manipulate, or mislead.151 The Ninth Circuit’s assess-
ment is closer to accurate, however tautological. When a plain-
tiff alleges a unified course of fraudulent conduct, which by its 
terms requires scienter, the claim will sound in fraud.152
B. ALLEGATIONS OF DUTY-BASED MISREPRESENTATION CLAIMS 
SOMETIMES SOUND IN FRAUD 
 
Neither negligent misrepresentation nor fraud by omission 
contains an element of scienter,153 therefore, alleging that sci-
enter is necessary for a claim to sound in fraud carries ramifi-
cations for the application of Rule 9(b) to these claims. It is de-
ceptively simple to conclude that fraud by omission is 
completely within the scope of Rule 9(b) because the claim 
bears the name fraud, and the cases applying some form of par-
ticularity are numerous.154 Though fraud by omission carries 
the magic word—fraud—it does not carry the critical element, 
scienter.155 When applying this test, a fraud by omission claim 
does not, by its terms, sound in fraud.156 Similarly, although 
negligent misrepresentation is related to a fraud claim, as both 
are based on misrepresentations, it does not, by its terms, 
sound in fraud, as no showing of scienter is necessary to prevail 
on the claim.157 Claims that do not in and of themselves require 
a showing of scienter do not sound in fraud.158
This is not to say that an allegation of negligent misrepre-
  
 
 149. Icebox-Scoops v. Finanz St. Honoré, B.V., 676 F. Supp. 2d 100, 110 
(E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 150. See supra Part II.E (explaining the current techniques used to deter-
mine whether an allegation sounds in fraud). 
 151. See supra Part II.E. 
 152. See supra Part II.E.  
 153. See supra Parts I.D.1‒2.  
 154. See, e.g., supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text. 
 155. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1999). 
 156. See supra Part I.D.1.  
 157. See supra Part I.D.2. 
 158. See supra Part III.A. 
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sentation or fraud by omission should never be held to a 
heightened pleading standard. However, the application must 
be tailored by the specific allegations in the case at hand. The 
language of Rule 9(b) is “cast in terms of the conduct alleged, 
and is not limited to allegations styled or denominated as 
fraud.”159 While a plaintiff need allege no more than negligence 
to proceed under a negligent misrepresentation claim, claims 
that do rely upon averments of fraud, specifically scienter, are 
subject to the test of Rule 9(b).160 Similarly, though an allega-
tion of fraud by omission does not require pleading scienter, if 
the allegations that form the basis of the claim include scienter, 
heightened pleading is the correct standard for those allega-
tions.161 Nevertheless, when a claim includes allegations of both 
fraudulent and non-fraudulent conduct, Rule 9(b)’s heightened 
pleading standard applies only to allegations of fraud, not to 
the complaint as a whole.162
This standard comports with the Fifth Circuit’s determina-
tion that “[w]here averments of fraud are made in a claim in 
which fraud is not an element, an inadequate averment of 
fraud does not mean that no claim has been stated,” rather the 
inadequate averments of fraud should be stricken from the 
claim and the claim should be evaluated under the liberal no-
tice pleading standards of Rule 8(a).
  
163
 
 159. Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 171 (2d Cir. 2004).  
 The combination of this 
principle with the requirement that a claim that sounds in 
fraud requires scienter gives plaintiffs at least two good options 
in pleading duty-based misrepresentation claims. The plaintiff 
can either allege intent to deceive and plead with particularity 
or simply plead to satisfy the elements of the duty-based claim, 
and bare notice pleading will apply. Given this understanding, 
plaintiffs that allege a duty-based misrepresentation alongside 
an actual fraud claim would be well-advised to plead conduct in 
the alternative. Instead of basing the claims on the same set of 
operative facts, they should plead separate facts for each claim, 
especially as the conduct relates to the required state of mind 
for each claim. This is recommended because where an inade-
quate fraud claim is so intertwined with a duty-based misrep-
 160. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1105 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(“Fraud can be averred by specifically alleging fraud, or by alleging facts that 
necessarily constitute fraud (even if the word ‘fraud’ is not used).”). 
 161. Id. at 1107. 
 162. Siegel v. Shell Oil Co., 480 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1039 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
 163. Lone Star Ladies Inv. Club v. Schlotzsky’s Inc., 238 F.3d 363, 368 (5th 
Cir. 2001). 
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resentation claim, a redaction that removes the allegations of 
the fraud claim may leave behind no other viable claim.164
C. FURTHER JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE NECESSITY OF SCIENTER 
FOR A CLAIM TO SOUND IN FRAUD 
  
The following discussion of the statutory interpretation of 
Rule 9(b) gives further credence to the proposition that an alle-
gation requires scienter for it to sound in fraud. This Section 
argues that the plain meaning of the statute applies only to al-
legations that are fraudulent at their core, requiring scienter. 
In addition, the canon of construction, expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius will be explored and applied to the two excep-
tions to the American liberal notice pleading system. The pur-
pose of the Federal Rules as a whole will also be examined in 
conjunction with heightened pleading and the requirement for 
scienter if an allegation is to sound in fraud. Additional practi-
cal considerations that weigh in favor of an articulable stand-
ard for what it means to sound in fraud will also be set forth.  
1. The Statutory Interpretation of Rule 9(b) Requires a 
Precise Standard by Which Allegations Can Be Determined to 
Sound in Fraud 
By its own terms, Rule 9(b) applies only to allegations of 
fraud and mistake.165 The plain meaning of the text of statutes 
should be dispositive.166 Although the language at issue in this 
case is a federal rule of procedure, such rules “have the force 
and effect of a statute.”167 “[I]n interpreting a statute a court 
should always turn to one cardinal canon before all others . . . 
courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it 
means and means in a statute what it says there.”168 Since only 
fraud and mistake are enumerated in the text,169
 
 164. Am. Realty Trust, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 362 F. 
Supp. 2d 744, 749 (N.D. Tex. 2005). 
 only allega-
tions of fraud and mistake should be held to particularized 
pleading. A claim that sounds in fraud will be held to the 
heightened pleading standard. But, in a cause of action where a 
 165. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).  
 166. Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004) (“We should prefer the 
plain meaning since that approach respects the words of Congress.”).  
 167. Rumsey v. George E. Failing Co., 333 F.2d 960, 962 (10th Cir. 1964); 
see also United States v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 361 F.2d 838, 839 (5th Cir. 
1966).  
 168. Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992).  
 169. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
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showing of scienter is not an element of the claim, the allega-
tion sounds in fraud only where the intent to deceive, manipu-
late, or mislead are among the allegations.170 Actual fraud 
clearly contains the scienter component, it is an element of the 
claim;171 fraudulent concealment does as well. Negligent mis-
representation and fraud by omission do not carry the scienter 
requirement.172 These duty-based claims do not, on their face, 
sound in fraud.173
Courts are not permitted to add new requirements to Rule 
9(b) simply because they like the effects of doing so; that is “a 
job for Congress, or for the various legislative, judicial, and ad-
visory bodies involved in the process of amending the Federal 
Rules.”
  
174 The plain meaning of the text clearly dictates that the 
particularity requirement applies only to allegations of actual 
fraud and mistake, no further justification is needed in light of 
the statutory language for these causes of action.175 Just as 
clearly, courts are not authorized to interpret Rule 9(b) to apply 
to all duty-based misrepresentations in a manner that is incon-
sistent with the language of the Rule. Because Rule 9(b) does 
not deal with “claims of fraud,” but rather with “allegations of 
fraud,” a precise understanding of what an allegation of fraud 
entails is necessary.176 Scienter fills the role of determining 
when an allegation sounds in fraud.177
Although the plain meaning of the text appears clear, past 
interpretation by the courts which expanded the particularity 
requirement to duty-based misrepresentations created ambigu-
ity over what it means for a claim to sound in fraud.
 Therefore, an allegation 
of scienter is required to necessitate particularity.  
178 The test 
proposed by this Note requires an allegation of scienter for the 
claim to sound in fraud. This test is in harmony with the Su-
preme Court’s holding that Rule 9(b) imposes a particularity 
requirement in exactly “two specific instances,” fraud or mis-
take, but not to unenumerated claims.179
 
 170. See supra notes 
 “Expressio unius est 
146–49 and accompanying text.  
 171. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.  
 172. See supra Parts I.D.1‒2.  
 173. See supra Part III.B. 
 174. Decker v. GlenFed, Inc., 42 F.3d 1541, 1546 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc). 
 175. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 176. See id. 
 177. See supra Part III.A. 
 178. See supra notes 134–37 and accompanying text.  
 179. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination 
Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 
Borden_MLR  
2014] PARTICULARS OF PARTICULARITY 1139 
 
exclusio alterius.”180
On the other hand, it has been argued that “the canon that 
expressing one item of a commonly associated group or series 
excludes another left unmentioned is only a guide, whose falli-
bility can be shown by contrary indications that adopting a par-
ticular rule or statute was probably not meant to signal any ex-
clusion of its common relatives.”
 The expression of these two items leaves 
other associated allegations excluded from the heightened 
pleading standard.  
181 However, the adoption of 
Rule 9(b) is itself an exception to a more general rule; that all 
other claims may be made with a short and plain statement of 
the claim that is plausible on its face.182 Express exceptions are 
to be narrowly construed, and no other exceptions are to be im-
plied from the existence of one exception.183
When interpreting the Federal Rules, the focus should be 
on the legislature’s purpose in enacting them.
  
184 The purpose 
was to eliminate the fact-based pleading requirements and the 
inherent booby traps within the previous pleading system.185 
The overall purpose was to allow more meritorious claims to be 
heard in court.186
Strict statutory interpretation is called for here because 
the Rule is not ambiguous, and even if it were, the ambiguous 
language should be given its least inclusive reading because the 
purpose of the Federal Rules is remedial.
 Since the purpose was to eliminate difficulties 
to entry of the judicial system, courts should interpret Rule 9(b) 
in a ways that will produce that result.  
187
 
 180. Id. The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. “As the 
maxim [expressio unius est exclusio alterius] is applied to statutory interpreta-
tion, where a form of conduct, the manner of its performance and operation, 
and the persons and things to which it refers are designated, there is an infer-
ence that all omissions should be understood as exclusions.” 2A SUTHERLAND’S 
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:23 (Norman J. Singer & J.D. 
Shambie Singer eds., 7th ed. 2007). 
 The notice pleading 
 181. United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002). 
 182. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (requiring pleadings to provide a “short 
and plain statement of the claim”), with FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (creating a height-
ened pleading standard for allegations of fraud and mistake). 
 183. United States v. California., 504 F.2d 750, 754 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 
1974).  
 184. Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981) (holding that where 
the purpose of the law is consistent with the text, the text cannot be held to be 
ambiguous). 
 185. See supra note 19. 
 186. See supra Part I.A. 
 187. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403 (1991) (stating that remedial 
statutes are to be liberally construed to achieve their remedial purpose).  
  
1140 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:1110 
 
standard should be liberally construed to achieve the remedial 
purpose, thereby narrowing the application of Rule 9(b), which 
deters otherwise meritorious claims from passing the gateway 
of pleading into the judicial system.  
2. Practical Considerations Favor Precisely Defining What It 
Means for an Allegation to Sound in Fraud 
A precise definition of what it means to sound in fraud pre-
vents the practical problems of litigation delays, dismissal of 
meritorious claims, and uncertainty over the proper pleading 
standard for allegations of misrepresentation. Supposed Rule 
9(b) violations breed litigation delays because additional time is 
required to amend the complaint.188 When an allegation does 
not truly sound in fraud, but the presumed pleading standard 
demands particularity, warranted claims will feasibly be dis-
missed.189
Courts should adopt this standard because avoidable 
amendments of complaints impose unnecessary costs and inef-
ficiencies on both the courts and party opponents.
  
190 Litigation 
delays are par for the course when a defendant asserts a Rule 
9(b) violation. Where a pleading does not satisfy the heightened 
requirements of Rule 9(b), the court should freely grant leave to 
amend.191 Rule 15 advises that even after a party amends a 
complaint once as a matter of course, leave to amend should be 
freely granted where justice requires.192
 
 188. Cf. Caputo v. Pfizer, Inc., 267 F.3d 181, 191 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he fail-
ure to grant leave to amend is an abuse of discretion unless the plaintiff has 
acted in bad faith or the amendment would be futile.”); Bly-Magee v. Califor-
nia, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We consistently have held that 
[when dismissing for failure to comply with Rule 9(b)] leave to amend should 
be granted unless the district court determines that the pleading could not 
possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
 The Supreme Court 
has held that leave to amend should be freely granted where 
there is an absence of any apparent prejudicial motive “such as 
undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive on the part of the 
 189. Fairman, supra note 29, at 295. 
 190. ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. Advest, Inc., 512 F.3d 46, 57 (1st Cir. 2008) 
(“Such a practice would dramatically undermine the ordinary rules governing 
the finality of judicial decisions, and should not be sanctioned in the absence of 
compelling circumstances.” (quoting James v. Watt, 716 F.2d 71, 78 (1st Cir. 
1983))). 
 191. See Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (recog-
nizing that courts almost always grant leave to amend to cure deficiencies in 
pleading fraud). 
 192. FED. R. CIV. P. 15.  
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movant.”193
The application of Rule 9(b) to duty-based fraud claims 
that do not ultimately sound in fraud also results in the dismis-
sal of meritorious claims. Where the heightened pleading 
standard requires more information than the plaintiff is able to 
allege, dismissal results.
 Regardless of the motive, however, the ensuing 
amendment of the complaint results in both delays to the liti-
gation and additional costs to the parties. Adopting this stand-
ard eliminates the requisite grant of leave to amend.  
194 In these cases, the plaintiff is re-
quired to make the case before discovery, which can be an im-
possible task.195 Though courts are generally more amenable to 
a relaxed pleading standard where information required to 
plead with particularity is uniquely within the control of the 
defendant, they are not always so accommodating.196 Uncer-
tainty reigns when particularity is applied arbitrarily, without 
reference to an allegation sounding in fraud, or a clear defini-
tion for what it means to sound in fraud,197 as exemplified by 
the Eames case. Uncertainty results in increased litigation, lit-
igation delays, and forum shopping.198
  CONCLUSION   
 A clear standard defining 
what it means to sound in fraud reduces these practical diffi-
culties, while harmonizing with the majority of precedent con-
cerning misrepresentation claims generally, and negligent mis-
representation claims in particular.  
Courts are split over the proper pleading standard applica-
ble to duty-based misrepresentation claims. This split demon-
strates the courts’ failure to flesh out the meaning of sounding 
in fraud. A claim that sounds in fraud requires particularized 
pleading, while a claim that sounds in negligence may survive 
without heightened pleading. The divergence over the proper 
standard can be resolved by precisely defining what it means 
for a claim or an allegation to sound in fraud. This Note pro-
 
 193. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).  
 194. See, e.g., Eames v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 04-1324-KAJ, 
2006 WL 2506640 (D. Del. Aug. 29, 2006), aff'd, 346 F. App'x 859 (3d Cir. 
2009). 
 195. See, e.g., Abels v. Farmers Commodities Corp., 259 F.3d 910, 921 (8th 
Cir. 2001) (holding that a plaintiff should be allowed discovery before having 
to meet the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b)). 
 196. See supra note 47. 
 197. See Fairman, supra note 29, at 297–99 (arguing that the application of 
Rule 9(b) is inconsistent and uncertain). 
 198. See Sovern, supra note 57, at 164.  
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poses that that definition centers on the requirement of scien-
ter, the defining feature of an intentional fraud claim. Given 
the varying standards and inconsistent application inherent in 
current heightened pleading, adopting the requirement of sci-
enter for a claim or allegation to sound in fraud would replace 
uncertainty with clarity. Ultimately, more duty-based misrep-
resentation claims might survive to be adjudicated on the mer-
its, which is precisely what the Federal Rules intend. This new 
standard does not require courts to change the way they ana-
lyze misrepresentation claims for pleading purposes, just the 
precision with which they do so. It also provides a clear stand-
ard for plaintiffs, and finally settles the pleading standard for 
all duty-based misrepresentation claims.  
 
